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When Less is More: Changes to the New
York Court of Appeals' Civil Jurisdiction
Luke Bierman*
"The difficulty in life is the choice."1
I. 'Introduction
January 1, 1986, was Independence Day for the New York
State Court of Appeals. On that date, New York's highest court
gained almost total discretion over its civil docket through an
amendment to the statutory provisions governing its appellate
jurisdiction.' The court's mandatory civil caseload, largely de-
pendent on disputes between or within lower courts, was essen-
tially abandoned and replaced with a predominantly discretion-
ary system of jurisdiction. This was no small accomplishment
considering that as-of-right appeals constituted 75% of the
court's civil caseload and approximately 60% of its total
caseload.3
These new jurisdictional rules, enacted following extensive
study,4 are designed to improve the court's efficiency.' This sys-
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1. GEORGE MOORE, THE BENDING OF THE Bow.
2. 1985 N.Y. Laws 300.
3. In 1985, 418 of 568 civil appeals decided were as-of-right and 719 total appeals
were decided. See 1986 ANN. REP. OF THE CLERK- OF THE CT. TO THE JUDGES OF THE N.Y.
ST. CT. OF APPEALS app. 5(A).
4. See, e.g., ROBERT MACCRATE ET AL., APPELLATE JUSTICE IN NEW YORK (1982)."
5. See GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, reprinted in 1985 N.Y. Laws 2.
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tem of discretionary jurisdiction also insures that the Court of
Appeals fulfills its role under the state constitution as a "law
court," establishing policy on matters of state-wide importance,
resolving questions of law, and settling conflicts in decisions
among the state's four intermediate appellate courts.' In short,
the court, no longer burdened by hundreds of civil appeals per-
ceived as legally insignificant, is free to concentrate on a select
group of cases that raise important issues of law and public
policy.7
This paper, an initial step of a larger project designed to
provide a comprehensive consideration of the Court of Appeals,
addresses some ramifications of the changes in the court's juris-
diction. Specifically, this paper will study characteristics of the
court's decisions, such as rates of affirmance, unanimity and
type of decision, i.e., opinion or memorandum. This examination
will improve our understanding of the judicial decision-making
process and enable us to view the Court of Appeals as an institu-
tion with a particular role in the prevailing legal and political
structures and processes.
II. Need for Study - New York Court of Appeals
Scholarly attention to the Court of Appeals is conspicuously
sparse, which is surprising considering the court's longstanding
prominence as a common law court. As long ago as 1913,
Learned Hand was willing to leave the United States District
Court to serve as Chief Judge of the New York Court of Ap-
peals, although the state's voters decided otherwise. Benjamin
Cardozo's tenure on the court provided the basis for his recogni-
tion as the epitome of a common law jurist and subsequent ap-
pointment to the United States Supreme Court. Merryman's re-
search on the sources of authority used by the California
Supreme Court confirms that the New York Court of Appeals'
decisions have long been considered influential on a national
scale.8
6. Id.; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5601 commentary at 197-98 (McKinney Supp. 1991);
id. 5602 commentary at 206-07.
7. See GOVERNOR'S MEMORANDUM, supra note 5; N.Y. Civ. PRAC. L. & R. 5601 com-
mentary at 197-98 (McKinney Supp. 1991); id. 5602 commentary at 206-07.
8. See John Henry Merryman, Toward a Theory of Citations: An Empirical Study
[Vol. 12:61
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The paucity of scholarly attention to the Court of Appeals
has not been overlooked by commentators. More than ten years
ago, Galie noted a lack of scholarly attention to the Court of
Appeals' criminal procedure and constitutional law decisions.9
More recently, Bonventre commented on the "curious" lack of
attention given to the Court of Appeals in his area of concern,
state constitutional adjudication.10 This same lack of scholarly
effort applies to the court's role as an institution and its place in
the judicial process.
Such scholarly neglect seems especially odd in light of the
increased attention state supreme courts-have received lately be-
cause of their substantive legal rulings and place in the nation's
judicial system." Indeed, the New York Court of Appeals has
been at the forefront of the trend to reinvigorate state constitu-
tional law, and its decisions on social, criminal and commercial
matters are closely watched as bellwethers of national trends.12
Its oversight of a complex judicial system, encompassing the na-
tion's largest urban area and sparsely populated rural regions, is
unique among state court administrative systems. Although re-
searchers seem to have finally learned that the United States
Supreme Court and other federal courts are not the only actors
in the judicial process, they largely have missed the New York
Court of Appeals notwithstanding recent efforts by Galie'3 and
Bonventre'4 to reverse the situation. The time is appropriate for
comprehensive consideration of the New York Court of Appeals
and this paper is the first step in such an undertaking.
of the Citation Practice of the California Supreme Court in 1950, 1960 and 1970, 50 S.
CAL. L. REV. 381, 401-403 (1977); John Henry Merryman, The Authority of Authority;
What the California Supreme Court Cited in 1950, 6 STAN. L. REV. 613, 667, 668 (1954).
9. See Peter J. Galie, State Constitutional Guarantees and Protection of Defend-
ants' Rights: The Case of New York, 1960-1978, 28 BUFF. L. REv. 157, 159, 193 (1979)..
10. See Vincent Martin Bonventre, State Constitutionalism in New York: A Non-
Reactive Tradition, 2 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. LAW 31, 31 (1989).
11. See, e.g., CHARLES H. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF
THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT (1988); G. ALAN TARR AND MARY CORNELIA ALDIS
PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN STATE AND NATION (1988); ROBERT F. WILLIAMS,
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS (1988).
12. See supra note 10.
13. Peter J. Galie, Modes of Constitutional Interpretation: The New York Court of
Appeals' Search for a Role, 4 EMERGING ISSUES ST. CONST. LAW 225 (1991).
14. Vincent Martin Bonventre, Court of Appeals - State Constitutional Law Re-
view, 1990, 12 PACE L. REV. 1 (1991).
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III. Indicators of Judicial Decision-Making
The 1986 jurisdictional change is an excellent point of de-
parture for considering aspects of the Court of Appeals' deci-
sion-making process. Reviewing Court of Appeals decisions
before and after the jurisdictional amendment provides an op-
portunity to assess whether civil appeals are treated differently
by the court acting with its newly provided discretion in ac-
cepting cases for review.
Numerous factors are available to assess how a court goes
about its business. Decisional characteristics, such as rates of af-
firmance, unanimity and type of decision, provide insight into
the judicial process. Likewise, jurisdictional factors, such as the
presence of a mandatory or discretionary caseload, offer oppor-
tunities to look at how a court works. Using these indicators for
insight into the Court of Appeals' decision-making process is
consistent with the well recognized proposition that the judicial
decision-making process encompasses far more than a court's
opinion and any resulting substantive legal analysis. It is appro-
priate, then, to consider some indicators in more detail.
A. Decisional Characteristics
From research on the United States Supreme Court and
other courts, we have findings that bear on and substantiate the
importance of decisional factors as indicators of judicial deci-
sion-making. For example, the manner of presentation to the
court, whether by oral argument or only on written submissions,
and the extent of questioning by judges are thought to affect the
decision-making process.'6 As lawyers have long appreciated, as-
signment of opinion writing can play a role in how judges resolve
a case and how an opinion is written.16 In addition, existence of
negotiation among judges for votes on particular cases or for
15. See, e.g., Stephen L. Washy Et Al., The Functions of Oral Argument in the U.S.
Supreme Court, 62 Q.J. OF SPEECH 410 (1976); Steven A. Peterson et. al., Patterns in
Supreme Court Oral Argument (1991) (unpublished paper presented at the 1991 Law
and Society Association Meeting).
16. See, e.g., Sue Davis, Power on the Court: Chief Justice Rehnquist's Opinion
Assignments, 74 JUDICATURE 66 (1990); Elliott E. Slotnick, Who Speaks for the Court?
Majority Opinion Assignment from Taft to Burger, 23 A. J. POL. Sci. 60 (1979); S. Sid-
ney Ulmer, The Use of Power in the Supreme Court: The Opinion Assignments of Earl
Warren, 1953-1960, 19 J. PUB. L. 49 (1970).
[Vol. 12:61
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specific language in decisions now is widely acknowledged. 17
Other matters scrutinized for insight into the judicial deci-
sion-making process include voting patterns, affirmance and re-
versal rates, and manner of publication of decisions. Identifica-
tion of the rates of affirmances and reversals"8 and the extent of
unanimity on particular courts19 are well established as indicat-
ing how the decision-making process proceeds. Practices involv-
ing publication of decisions are also used in assessing the deci-
sion-making process. We have known for some time that the
United States Courts of Appeals decide many cases without
published opinion although the precise frequency varies by cir-
cuit. 0 Disagreement exists as to whether this common practice
includes legally and politically significant cases.2 All the com-
mentators, however, proceed from the general proposition that
published decisions are considered more noteworthy or impor-
tant than unpublished decisions. It seems safe, then, to postu-
late that the type of decision is an indicator of the judicial deci-
sion-making process.
Another matter considered to illuminate the judicial deci-
sion-making process is the extent to which an appellate court
uses and refers to the opinion under review. It has been sug-
gested that appellate court references to the lower court's opin-
17. See, e.g., WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 302 (1987); BERNARD
SCHWARTZ, SUPER CHIEF, EARL WARREN AND His SUPREME COURT: A JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY
89-90 (1983).
18. See, e.g., J. WOODFORD HOWARD JR., COURTS OF APPEAL IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYSTEM 67-71 (1981); Burton Atkins, Interventions and Power in Judicial Hierarchies:
Appellate Courts in England and the United States, 24 L. & Soc. REV. 1 (1990); Jeffery
A. Segal & Harold J. Spaeth, Rehnquist Court Disposition of Lower Court Decisions:
Affirmance not Reversal, 74 JUDICATURE 84 (1990).
19. See, e.g., DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT 102, 154 (1980); Stephen C. Halpern & Kenneth N. Vines, Institutional Disunity,
the Judges' Bill and the Role of the U.S. Supreme Court, 30 W. POL. Q. 471 (1977).
20. See, e.g., Daniel N. Hoffman, Non-publication of Federal Appellate Court
Opinions, 6 JUST. Sys. J. 405 (1981); William L. Reynolds & William M. Richman, The
Non-Precedential Precedent-Limited Publication and No-Citation Rules in the United
States Courts of Appeals, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1167 (1978); Philip Schuchman & Alan
Gelfand, The Use of Local Rule 21 in the Fifth Circuit: Can Judges Select Cases of "No
Precedential Value?", 29 EMORY L.J. 195 (1980); Donald R. Songer, Criteria for Publica-
tion of Opinions in the U.S. Courts of Appeals: Formal Rules versus Empirical Reality,
73 JUDICATURE 307 (1990).
21. Compare Hoffman, supra note 20; Reynolds & Richman, supra note 20 and
Songer, supra note 20 with Schuchman & Gelfand, supra note 20.
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ion may indicate the impact of the lower court's work on the
appellate court's deliberations or satisfy the appellate court's
need for legal rationalization for the result reached.22
B. Jurisdictional Factors
Less often considered are the effects of jurisdictional factors
on the judicial decision-making process. Casper and Posner's
work on the United States Supreme Court's caseload summa-
rizes how jurisdictional changes have affected the Court's work-
load and output.23 It seems self evident that the number and
type of cases that reach a court's docket necessarily affect the
process and outcome. To be sure, then, appellate jurisdiction,
whether mandatory or discretionary, affects the decision-making
process. Mandatory jurisdiction can be seen to constrain a court,
requiring it to decide cases in numbers and on issues it may not
believe necessary to the efficient execution of its mandate or op-
eration of the judicial system in which it participates. On the
other hand, discretionary jurisdiction provides a court with the
ability to use its docket to achieve objectives consistent with its
agenda.
Among the few studies dealing with how jurisdictional fac-
tors affect appellate court work is an early article by Schubert,
who used game theory to suggest that United States Supreme
Court Justices' certiorari votes were strategically made to effect
substantive outcomes.2' Tanenhaus and his colleagues postu-
lated that United States Supreme Court Justices base their cer-
tiorari decisions on cues and signals from lower court decisions
and found correlations with such decisional characteristics as
the party seeking review and subject matter.25 Ulmer identified
connections between a United States Supreme Court Justice's
decisions on certiorari and the merits and showed that a Jus-
tice's vote on certiorari was a predictor of the Justice's vote on
22. See RICHARD J. RICHARDSON & KENNETH N. VINES, THE POLITICS OF FEDERAL
COURTS 156-58 (1970).
23. See GERHARD CASPER & RICHARD POSNER, THE WORKLOAD OF THE SUPREME
COURT 19-25 (1976).
24. See GLENDON SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR 210
(1959).
25. See Joseph Tanenhaus, et. al., The Supreme Court's Certiorari Jurisdiction:
Cue Theory, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 111 (Glendon Schubert ed., 1963).
[Vol. 12:61
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the merits. 26 Provine found United States Supreme Court Jus-
tices' certiorari votes to be a function of each Justice's percep-
tion of his and the Court's role. She was able to validate Ulmer's
findings but found less substantiation for Tanenhaus' basic pro-
positions concerning cue theory and actually refuted Schubert's
theories. 27 Howard, in his work on the United States Courts of
Appeals, reported that the Supreme Court's certiorari determi-
nations were based more on policy objectives than resolving in-
ter-circuit conflict.28 More recently, Perry has undertaken exten-
sive study of the United States Supreme Court and its certiorari
practices to suggest that there is comparatively little bargaining
and negotiating in that Court's decision-making process.2 9
Research on other courts also reveals the use of jurisdic-
tional concerns for indications about the decision-making pro-
cess. Baum, in a study of the California Supreme Court, echoes
Ulmer in finding that the California Justices reach similar con-
clusions on certiorari and the merits and suggesting that certio-
rari is favored in order to reverse lower court mistakes.3 0 In fur-
ther work on state supreme courts, Flango recently concluded
that cue theory provided an insufficient explanation for case se-
lection by the Georgia and Illinois Supreme Courts but that ju-
dicial perceptions concerning appellate review correlated to case
selection."
The works referred to in this section make evident that ju-
risdictional considerations and decisional characteristics are use-
ful tools in assessing a court's decision-making process. Drawing
on these analytical factors, this paper will compare characteris-
tics of the New York Court of Appeals' decisions during two dis-
26. See S. Sidney Ulmer, The Decision to Grant Certiorari as an Indicator to Deci-
sion "On The Merits", 4 POLITY 429 (1972).
27. See PRoVINE, supra note 19, at 76-82, 107-108, 162-172.
28. See HOWARD, supra note 18, at 66-71. See also Richardson & Vines, supra note
22, at 161.
29. See H.W. Perry, Jr., Deciding to Decide in the U.S. Supreme Court: Bargain-
ing, Accommodation, and Roses (1986)(unpublished paper presented at 1986 American
Political Science Association meeting).
30. See Lawrence Baum, Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California
Supreme Court: Patterns in Court and Individual Behavior, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
714, 743 (1976).
31. See Victor E. Flango, Case Selection in the Georgia and Illinois Supreme
Courts, 12 JUST. Sys. J. 384 (1987).
19921
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crete time periods, one while the court's civil jurisdiction was
largely mandatory and the other when the court operated under
a largely discretionary system of jurisdiction. To better appreci-
ate the parameters of this investigation, it is appropriate to de-
scribe the system of civil appeals in the New York state judicial
system.
IV. Civil Appeals in New York
A. New York State Court Structure
In New York, civil lawsuits can be initiated in one of several
trial courts, depending on the nature of the controversy and the
amount in demand.3 2 The most routine and minor civil cases be-
gin in the inferior trial courts, which include the Town, Village,
City and District Courts outside New York City and the Civil
Court in New York City.3 Civil cases with larger monetary
stakes or specific subject matter, such as family disputes, pro-
bate matters or claims against the state, are commenced in the
superior trial courts.3 4 These courts include the County, Family
and Surrogate's Courts, as well as the Court of Claims and the
Supreme Court, which is the trial court of general jurisdiction.3 5
Civil appeals from the inferior courts outside New York
City and its suburbs are brought before the County Court; civil
appeals inside New York City and its suburbs are brought
before the Appellate Term of the Supreme Court. 6 From there,
along with initial review of civil cases from the superior trial
courts and some administrative agencies, cases go to the Appel-
late Division of the Supreme Court.3 7 This court has broad juris-
diction which includes as-of-right appeals from most intermedi-
ate orders and final judgments.3 8
The Appellate Division is comprised of four geographically
32. See generally 1989 REP. OF CHIEF ADMIN. OF THE CTS., ST. OF N.Y. 1-2, 9 [herein-
after 1989 Report]. This general description is derived from the 1989 Report and consti-
tutional and statutory provisions.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5701 et seq. (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991).
[Vol. 12:61
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disparate courts, identified by department. 9 The First and Sec-
ond Departments encompass New York City and the metropoli-
tan suburbs; the Third is located in upstate northeastern New
York and the southern tier; and the Fourth covers central and
western upstate New York.' e The First and Second Departments
traditionally have had much larger caseloads than the Third and
Fourth Departments." Indeed, a task force appointed by the
Governor and Chief Judge to consider the Appellate Division
caseload unanimously concluded that "a caseload crisis of signif-
icant proportions exists, in the Second Department."' 2 The
Third Department, centered in Albany, the state capital, decides
many cases involving the policies and operation of state govern-
ment. The Fourth Department in the latter years of the 1980's
endured a substantial caseload increase, consisting largely of
drug cases in the metropolitan areas of Utica, Syracuse, Roches-
ter and Buffalo. The courts vary in size from fifteen justices in
the Second Department to nine in the Third Department and
usually sit in panels of five, although the Second Department
generally sits in panels of four. 3
Appeals from the Appellate Division are taken to the Court
of Appeals, New York's highest court and final arbiter on mat-
ters of state law."" The court has seven judges appointed by the
Governor for fourteen-year terms, although prior to 1978 the
judges were elected .' As of January 1987, all of the court's seven
judges had been appointed by Governor Mario M. Cuomo. Five
judges constitute a quorum4 and four judges must agree for a
decision to be reached.'7 A constitutional provision allows the
court to substitute a Supreme Court justice when a Court of Ap-
39. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 4(a) (McKinney 1987).
40. Id. §§ 4(a),6(a).
41. See 1989 Report, supra note 32, at 26. In 1988, the First Department had 3,099
dispositions, the Second had 6,931, the Third had 1,386 and the Fourth had 1,809. Id.
42. Report of the Appellate Division Task Force, (hereinafter Task Force Report)
November 8, 1990, at 1.
43. Task Force Report, supra note 42, at 5, 6. Recent efforts to appoint five addi-
tional justices to the Second Department to assist in resolving the caseload crisis have
been unsuccessful. Gary Spencer, Appointments of Five Appellate Justices Not Likely
Soon, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 9, 1991, at 1, col. 1.
44. N.Y. CONST. art VI, § 3 (McKinney 1987).
45. N.Y. CONST. art. VI §2, former § 2 (c) (McKinney 1987).
46. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(a) (McKinney 1987).
47. Id.
19921
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peals judge is temporarily absent or unable to act."'
Appeals to the Court of Appeals in criminal cases are availa-
ble only by permission. 9 Only one application for criminal leave
to appeal is available,50 which can be made to the Chief Judge of
the Court of Appeals who designates one of the seven judges of
the court to decide it." Upon denial, reconsideration can be re-
quested and the same judge will review the application. Alter-
natively, application can be made to a justice of the Appellate
Division that decided the case.53 This alternate procedure is
most often invoked where an Appellate Division justice has dis-
sented in the case.5'
In contrast, civil appeals are available as-of-right and by
leave of the Court of Appeals or Appellate Division. Of-right ap-
peals, which are statutorily prescribed, must be heard by the
court.15 Likewise, the court must hear a case in which the Appel-
late Division grants leave to appeal."' The technical procedures
for seeking leave from the Appellate Division vary slightly
among the Departments.57 The Court of Appeals considers en
banc those applications for leave to appeal; two votes are neces-
sary for leave.58 Applications for leave in civil cases, unlike those
48. Id.
49. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.90(2) (McKinney 1983). Appeals as-of-right in capi-
tal cases are available, id., at §§ 450.70, 450.80, but there currently are no capital crimes
in New York. See People v. Smith, 63 N.Y.2d 41, 468 N.E.2d 879, 479 N.Y.S.2d 706
(1984).
50. N.Y. COMe. CODEs R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.10(a) (1989).
51. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.20 (2)(a), (3)(b) (McKinney 1983); N.Y. CoMe.
CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.10(a) (1989).
52. N.Y. COMe. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, § 500.10(b) (1989).
53. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 460.20(2)(a) (McKinney 1983). If the appeal is not from
the Appellate Division but from a lower court sitting as an intermediate appellate court,
application can only be made to a Court of Appeals judge. Id. § 460.20 (2)(b).
54. See Stuart M. Cohen, Criminal Leave Applications to the Court of Appeals, 62
N.Y. ST. B.J. 28, 30 (1990).
55. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5601 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 1991). The court retains
authority to ensure that an appeal meets the as-of-right requirements and can refuse to
hear an appeal as-of-right if it determines that the requirements have not been satisfied.
See, e.g., Matter of Toilman v. State, 77 N.Y.2d 988, 571 N.Y.S.2d 911, 575 N.E.2d 397
(1991).
56. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5602(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
57. See, e.g., id.; N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 22, §§ 600.14(b) (1989) (First
Department), 670.6(c) (1987) (Second Department), 800.2(a) (1987) (Third Department),
1000.2(a)(1) (1988) (Fourth Department).
58. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5602(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991). This statutory require-
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/2
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in criminal cases, can first be sought from the Appellate Divi-
sion."' If unsuccessful, leave can be sought from the Court of
Appeals.6 0 However, if first denied by the Court of Appeals,
leave cannot be sought from the Appellate Division.6
The court disposes of most appeals in three ways - by af-
firming, modifying or reversing - and issues two types of deci-
sions - opinions and memoranda. Opinions are generally per-
ceived as more important than memoranda. Opinions, with the
judicial author identified, generally are more extensive and are
prominently located in the front of each volume of the official
New York Reports. Memoranda, issued by the court without
identification of an author, are summary in format and may ex-
plicitly adbpt the reasoning of the lower court's decision or that
of a dissenter below. With this general design of the state court
structure, an explanation of the Court of Appeals' civil jurisdic-
tion before and after the 1986 change is appropriate.
B. Court of Appeals' Civil Jurisdiction - Before and After
The New York Constitution provides a foundation for the
civil jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals.6 2 Generally, the Court
of Appeals receives its civil caseload from the Appellate Division
and the civil portion of the court's docket predominates.6 In
1985, 568 of 719 cases were civil, constituting almost 80%,", and
in 1989, after the 1986 amendment awarding the court almost
total discretion over its civil docket, 192 of 295 cases, 65%, were
civil.65
Prior to the jurisdictional change, an appeal as-of-right to
ment, effective January 1, 1986, 1985 N.Y. Laws 300, § 2, apparently codified existing
practice. See supra 5602 commentary at 207.
59. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5602(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991)
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 3 (McKinney 1987).
63. The court's jurisdiction is quite technical and has been subject to extensive in-
terpretation over the years. The leading commentary in this area remains HENRY COHEN
& ARTHUR KARGER, THE POWERS OF THE NEW YORK COURT OF APPEALS (1951). For pur-
poses of this paper, some of the descriptions of the technical requirements have been
simplified somewhat.
64. 1989 ANN. REP. OF THE CLERK OF THE CT. TO THE JUDGES OF THE N.Y. ST. CT. OF
APPEALS app. 5(A),(B) [hereinafter 1989 Annual Report].
65. Id.
19921
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the Court of Appeals in a civil case was available in several cate-
gories of cases. The most common category was when the Appel-
late Division made a final determination in a case initiated in a
superior trial court or administrative agency and there was a dis-
sent on a question of law in favor of the appellant, a substantial
modification, or a reversal. 6 Appeals as-of-right also were avail-
able when the Appellate Division made a final determination di-
rectly involving a state or federal constitutional question67 or
when a court or administrative agency made a final determina-
tion in a case which had been remanded by the Appellate Divi-
sion for further proceedings, and could not then be appealed to
the Court of Appeals because the decision lacked finality.6
Cases in these latter categories were less frequent than those
formerly described. Appeals as-of-right were also available in
other very limited situations,69 but rarely occurred.
In all other cases, under the rules prevailing before January
1, 1986, permission, or leave-to-appeal, was required for a civil
appeal to the Court of Appeals. Where the Appellate Division
made a final determination not appealable as-of-right and the
case originated in a superior trial court or administrative agency,
leave was available from either the Appellate Division or Court
of Appeals.7 0 Leave-to-appeal was available only from the Appel-
late Division where that court made a non-final determination7 1
or where the case originated in an inferior court.7 2 Leave was
also available in certain other limited, rarely encountered,
circumstances.7 3
66. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 5601 former (a) (McKinney 1983) (repealed 1985).
67. Id. 5601(b)(1).
68. Id. 5601(d) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
69. Id. 5601(b)(2), (c) (McKinney 1983). Subsection (b)(2) allows a direct appeal to
the Court, of Appeals where there is a final judgment in a court of original instance and
the only issue is the constitutional validity of federal or New York statutes. Id.
5601(b)(2). The constitutional issue must be substantial. Gerzof v. Gulotta, 40 N.Y.2d
825, 355 N.E.2d 797, 387 N.Y.S.2d 568 (1976). Subsection (c) allows a direct appeal from
an order granting a new trial or affirming the grant of a new trial if the appellant stipu-
lates that "upon affirmance, judgment absolute shall be entered against him." See N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5601 commentary at 490-499.
70. Id. 5602(a)(1)(i) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
71. Id. 5602(b)(1) (McKinney 1983).
72. Id. 5602(b)(2).
73. Leave was available from the Appellate Division or Court of Appeals where an
appeal was sought from a final judgment of a superior trial court or a final determination
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Effective with appeals taken on and after January 1, 1986,7"
the New York Legislature amended the Court of Appeals' civil
jurisdiction to provide that court with a large degree of discre-
tion over its civil docket. No longer is a mandatory appeal avail-
able where a single Appellate Division justice dissents or the Ap-
pellate Division reverses or modifies. Rather, an appeal as-of-
right can be taken where the Appellate Division makes a final
determination in a case initiated in a superior trial court or ad-
ministrative agency and two Appellate Division justices dissent
on a question of law in favor of the appellant.75 The amendment
did not affect the availability of appeals as-of-right in those
other circumstances where an appeal as-of-right previously was
allowed.7 6
With the jurisdictional changes to mandatory appeals came
changes in the rules concerning appeals by permission. Leave-to-
appeal now exists in a broader range of civil cases. For example,
leave is available from the Appellate Division or Court of Ap-
peals where the Appellate Division makes a final decision not
appealable as-of-right (e.g., without two dissents or a substantial
constitutional question) if the case originates in a superior trial
court or administrative agency. Leave-to-appeal is available only
from the Appellate Division where that court makes a non-final
determination or where the .case arises in an inferior court, as
under the former jurisdictional provisions."1 The availability of
leave in the other rarely encountered circumstances remains the
same.
78
Because the court's criminal jurisdiction has long been es-
of an administrative agency where the final action was necessarily affected by a prior
Appellate Division order which was not appealable as-of-right. N.Y. CIv. PRAc. L. & R.
5602 (a)(1)(ii) (McKinney Supp. 1991). The same courts could grant leave from a non-
final Appellate Division order in proceedings against public bodies or officers unless the
order granted or affirmed the grant of a new trial or hearing in which case only the Court
of Appeals could grant leave. Id. 5602 (a)(2) (McKinney 1983).
74. 1985 N.Y. Laws 300, § 3.
75. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5601(a) (McKinney Supp. 1991).
76. See supra notes 67-69. N.Y. Civ. PROC. L. & R. 5601(d) (concerning appeals as-
of-right of prior non-final Appellate Division orders) has been amended to include cases
originating in arbitration. 1986 N.Y. Laws 316, § 1.
77. See supra notes 71-72.
78. See supra note 73. N.Y. CIv. PRAC. L. & R. 5601(a)(1) (concerning appeals by
leave of the Appellate Division or the Court of Appeals) has been amended to include
cases originating in arbitration. 1986 N.Y. Laws 316, § 2.
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sentially discretionary,"9 the change in the civil docket means
that the court has become essentially a certiorari court. That the
jurisdictional amendment achieved its desired aim is evident
from 1989 statistics showing 73% of the court's civil appellate
caseload arising from permission." It is clear that under the new
jurisdictional scheme, civil appeals as-of-right have been sharply
curtailed. Having described the basic environment in which the
Court of Appeals operates, we now turn to the parameters of
this study.
V. Scope of this Study
A. Areas of Inquiry
While it is clear that the jurisdictional amendment provides
the Court of Appeals with certiorari-like jurisdiction, it is less
clear whether the amendment and resulting changes in caseload
composition affect the manner in which civil appeals are treated
by the court. Although the jurisdictional changes may have pro-
duced more permissive appeals, there may be differences in the
rates at which the Court of Appeals and the Appellate Division
grant leave. One might also surmise that after the jurisdictional
changes, the decisional characteristics of the court's output
would change. For example, if the court is more selective in as-
sembling its docket based on a case's perceived importance, one
might expect the court to use opinions, as opposed to memo-
randa, more frequently. Also, consistent with Baum's finding
that the California Supreme Court intervenes to reverse its in-
termediate appellate courts' decisions, 81 one would expect a
higher percentage of reversals - since the Court of Appeals
now has permissive review of those cases reversed or modified by
the Appellate Division - when the latter court exercises its er-
ror correction function. As Halpern & Vines expected for United
79. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 450.90 (McKinney 1983). See also Cohen, supra note 54,
at 31.
80. In 1989, 141 of 192 civil appeals were by leave of either the Court of Appeals or
the Appellate Division. See 1989 Annual Report, supra note 64.
81. See Baum, supra note 30, at 743. Baum described this approach as a monitor
policy: "[wihere a majority of the justices tentatively disagree with the court of appeals
decision in a case . . . the supreme court is strongly inclined to accept [that] case." Id.
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States Supreme Court certiorari patterns," there might also be
fewer unanimous decisions since important public policy issues,
those likely to be found in the cases chosen by the court to de-
cide, breed divisiveness, unlike mandatory appeals involving rel-
atively well settled legal principles.
Other projections can be made. One might see the Court of
Appeals explicitly relying on lower court decisions less fre-
quently. Now the cases the court chooses to hear are seen as
important enough to demand that the state's highest court
speak on the issues raised. With the jurisdictional change re-
moving one-dissent appeals from the court's mandatory review
so that the court now must affirmatively place them on its
docket, one might see more reversals in these kinds of cases. 3
With two-dissent cases receiving mandatory review, we should
be sensitive to the possibility of changes in the voting patterns
of Appellate Division justices or the treatment by Court of Ap-
peals judges of cases with intra-Appellate Division dispute.
To examine these propositions, this study will focus on the
characteristics of the Court of Appeals' decisions in different ju-
risdictional categories before and after the amendment. Specifi-
cally, the following questions will be addressed:
* whether the composition of the Court of Appeals' civil docket
has changed with regard to the number of as-of-right cases, Court
of Appeals leave-granted cases and Appellate Division leave-
granted cases subsequent to the amendment?;
* whether the Court of Appeals' rates of affirmance, unanimity,
decision type and adoption of reasoning below in Appellate Divi-
sion two-dissent cases are different now than before the
amendment?;
* whether the Court of Appeals' rates of affirmance, unanimity,
decision type and adoption of reasoning below in Appellate Divi-
sion one-dissent cases are different now than before the amend-
ment?; and
* whether the Court of Appeals' rates of affirmance, unanimity,
decision type and adoption of reasoning below in appeal as-of-
right cases, Court of Appeals leave granted cases, and Appellate
Division leave granted cases are different, both before and after
82. See Halpern & Vines, supra note 19, at 475. The authors concluded: "We were
wrong." Id.
83. See supra note 75.
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the amendment.
As is evident from these research questions, this study's focus is
confined to Court of Appeals decisions and is not intended to
consider questions related to access to the court. Likewise, this
study will not analyze differences in the Court of Appeals' treat-
ment of the four Appellate Division courts. Having set forth this
study's areas of inquiry, we turn now to the methodology used in
conducting this analysis.
B. Methodology
To conduct this study, all decisions of the Court of Appeals
issued during the 1980-1981, 1981-1982, 1987-1988 and 1988-
1989 court terms were examined.8 ' Included for analysis were all
cases decided by the court acting pursuant to its civil appellate
jurisdiction."5 Excluded were two types of cases that diverged
from the court's usual processes - election cases, usually heard
outside of regularly scheduled terms of court and in an expe-
dited fashion,"' and a few cases argued during one court term
but decided in the following term.8 7 For each decision, data was
recorded on the jurisdictional predicate (e.g., constitutional
question, dissent, etc.), disposition (e.g., affirmance, modification
or reversal), and decision type (e.g., opinion or memorandum)
and vote.88 Each case was cross referenced to its decision in the
Appellate Division and data from that court's resolution of the
case, such as vote, disposition and decision type, were collected.
84. These decisions are reprinted in the official New York Reports, Second Series.
Although the court's term technically is the calendar year, I chose to use a term begin-
ning in September, when the court traditionally returns from summer recess, because of
the continuity in hearing and deciding cases afforded. The term of the United States
Supreme Court provides a comparable example.
85. In addition to its civil appellate jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals has other civil
jurisdiction, such as original jurisdiction to review judicial disciplinary rulings and juris-
diction to entertain questions certified from federal courts. See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, §§ 3,
22 (McKinney 1987).
86. There were twenty election cases in the 1980-81 court term, twelve in the 1981-
82, two in the 1987-1988 court term and three in the 1988-1989 court term.
87. For example, the study did not include cases argued during the 1986-87 term
and decided during the 1987-88 term. There was one case decided in 1981-82 from an
earlier term and two in 1987-88.
88. For purposes of this study, the concurrence of individual judges in a disposition,
even on different grounds with a separate writing, was treated as an unanimous decision.
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Court terms were selected for this study because the in-
tended comparative analysis required time periods before and
after the jurisdictional amendment. During each specified time
period, before and after the change in jurisdictional rule, the
Court of Appeals' membership did not change. 9 This minimizes
the possibility that changes in the court's personnel could ex-
plain any changes in court action. Because the court's member-
ship had been stable for more than six months prior to the peri-
ods examined, the possibility that a new member's socialization
period affected the decisional process was minimized. To control
further for variation in membership, those few cases in which
Supreme Court justices were substituted for Court of Appeals
judges in accordance with a constitutional provision were
excluded.90
Generally, in civil appeals, about one year elapses from dis-
position in the Appellate Division to disposition in the Court of
Appeals. Accordingly, cases appealed to the Court of Appeals
under the post-January 1, 1986 jurisdictional rules were likely to
have reached the Court of Appeals and have been decided in
1987. This made the 1987-88 court term an appropriate starting
point for the post-jurisdictional-change period. The 1987-88 and
1988-89 court terms were also the most recent ones for which
complete data were available in the official reports at the time
this study was conducted. These terms were also sufficiently be-
yond the effective date of the amendment so that the effect of
any transitional period between the different jurisdictional
schemes was likely to be absent or at least limited. Those few
cases decided by the court after the amendment which were gov-
erned by the rules in place before the amendment were also
89. During 1980-81 and 1981-82, the seven judges of the Court of Appeals, with the
year their service commenced and the method of their selection, were Chief Judge Law-
rence H. Cooke (1979, appointed) and Associate Judges Matthew J. Jasen (1968,
elected), Dominick L. Gabrielli (1973, elected), Hugh R. Jones (1973, elected), Sol Wach-
tler (1973, elected), Jacob D. Fuchsberg (1975, elected) and Bernard S. Meyer (1979,
appointed). During the 1987-88 and 1988-89 terms, the seven judges, all appointed by
Governor Cuomo, see supra note 45 and accompanying text, and their year of appoint-
ment, were Chief Judge Sol Wachtler (1985) and Associate Judges Richard D. Simons
(1983), Judith S. Kaye (1983), Fritz W. Alexander, II (1985), Vito J. Titone (1985), Stew-
art F. Hancock, Jr. (1986) and Joseph W. Bellacosa (1987).
90. See supra note 48. There were 13 cases with substituted judges in 1987-88 and
five in 1988-89.
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excluded." '
VI. An Overview of the Court of Appeals' Work - Before
and After
We begin the examination of the Court of Appeals' work,
before and after the jurisdictional change, with an overview of
the data showing the way civil cases decided by the court
reached its docket and the decisional characteristics of those
cases. After this general review, we can proceed to a more de-
tailed analysis of the data.
Perhaps the most obvious change after the jurisdictional
amendment is one already alluded to: a significant reduction in
the number of civil appeals decided by the Court of Appeals.9 2
The court's civil caseload dropped by more than half: from 470
and 551 civil appeals during 1980-81 and 1981-82, to 206 and 180
in 1987-88 and 1988-89, respectively. With this change came
another obvious one, also previously noted - approximately
three-quarters of the court's civil caseload now reaches the court
by leave rather than as-of-right.9' Some three-quarters of the
civil docket consisted of as-of-right appeals before the amend-
ment as compared to about one-quarter after the amendment.9 5
The percentage of civil appeals arising by leave of the Ap-
pellate Division has more than doubled after the jurisdictional
change. 6 Further, the rate of appeals by leave of the Court of
Appeals as a percentage of total appeals by leave has increased
markedly, whereas appeals by leave of the Appellate Division as
a percentage of total appeals by leave decreased after the
change. 7 The increased role of the Court of Appeals in choosing
its civil caseload is evident.
The study shows that the percentage of civil cases with one
Appellate Division justice dissenting decided by the Court of
Appeals has decreased while the percentage of cases with two
91. There was one case decided in 1987-88 under prior law and two in 1988-89.
92. See Table A.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. See Table B.
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Appellate Division justices dissenting has increased. 8 These
changes, along with the increased percentage of cases in which
the Appellate Division granted leave-to-appeal after the amend-
ment,99 suggest that the Appellate Division justices may be al-
tering their manner of judicial decision-making to compensate
for the diminished opportunities for as-of-right review by the
Court of Appeals.
During the terms studied the court consistently affirmed
about two-thirds of its civil appeals.100 There is only a slight de-
crease in the rate of affirmance after the jurisdictional change, 10'
but not the substantial change that might have been expected
from the increased opportunity for reversals and modifications
after the court gained control of its docket. Likewise, the court
seemed to take a common view of civil cases as there was a con-
sistently high rate of unanimity before and after the
amendment.'
An obvious change, however, is apparent from the increase
in the percentage of cases decided by opinion rather than memo-
randum after the jurisdictional change. 0 3 This result suggests
that having control over its civil docket allows the court to con-
centrate on cases it perceives as significant. This proposition
finds support in the court's decreased tendency to rely on the
reasoning of the Appellate Division and instead provide its own
explanation for its decision.' 0" This development presents the
possibility that the Court of Appeals has relinquished much of
its authority to ensure correct resolution of civil cases to the Ap-
pellate Division, which now often operates as the sole appellate
tribunal and ultimate arbiter. With these broad observations in
mind, it is appropriate to turn to a more detailed assessment of
how the court does its work.
98. See Tables C and D.
99. See Table A.
100. See Table E.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. (data on court's reliance on the Appellate Division).
1992]
19
PACE LAW REVIEW
VII. Access
A. By Leave or As-of-Right
Grouping civil cases by jurisdictional predicate graphically
illustrates the extent of the change in the manner by which civil
cases reach the Court of Appeals after the jurisdictional amend-
ment.1"5 Prior to the amendment, about 80% of the court's civil
caseloadarose as-of-right, whereas after the amendment the per-
centage of cases arising as-of-right were 20% in 1987-88 and
28% in 1988-89.11' The Court of Appeals exercised discretion in
assembling its civil docket in the terms after the amendment, as
evidenced by the court's granting leave-to-appeal in 64% and
46% of the civil cases heard in the 1987-88 and 1988-89 terms
respectively, as compared to only 8% and 11% in the 1980-81
and 1981-82 terms respectively. 107 But the substantial decrease
in the civil caseload after the amendment reveals that the court
has failed to satisfy the expectations of some commentators, who
thought the court would grant leave to worthy cases after the
amendment in numbers equal to the now-displaced "as-of-right"
cases.'0 8 For example, in 1981-82, there were 551 total civil ap-
peals; this number decreased to 180 in 1988-89.1°9
This suggests that the Court of Appeals has a definite vision
of its role after the amendment and is actively working to ac-
complish its goal. The court's refusal to accept more cases for
review after the amendment manifests its intent to make the
Appellate Division the court of last resort in most cases, thereby
limiting its place to the ultimate arbiter of important cases deal-
ing with significant legal, social or political issues. This role mir-
rors that of the United States Supreme Court as described by
Howard" 0 and Richardson and Vines."' They argue that the na-
tion's highest court is more of a policy organ than an appellate
court, and is content to allow the United States Courts of Ap-
peals to function as the sole appellate courts for most
105. See Table A.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra note 6.
109. See Table A.
110. See HOWARD, supra note 18.
111. See RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 22.
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litigants.11 '
This hypothesis reveals much about the nature of appellate
justice in the New York court system. As the highest court in
the state, the Court of Appeals had long been the ultimate arbi-
ter of individual cases, not just important issues. The court's
caseload before the amendment, when as-of-right appeals domi-
nated its civil docket, required it to ensure that proper law was
applied by trial and lower appellate courts in many legally insig-
nificant cases. This provided a multi-level appeal process, at
least where the lower courts had split either through reversal,
modification or dissent at an intermediate appellate level. The
Court of Appeals' failure to accept more civil cases after the ju-
risdictional amendment prevents it from performing the review
function in most cases. Thus, litigants now are much less likely
to receive further judicial review.
The decreased likelihood of review in the Court of Appeals
is obvious when one compares that court's decreasing caseload to
the Appellate Division's increasing caseload. ' This develop-
ment reflects the Court of Appeals' tacit endorsement of a single
level of appellate review and the increased importance of the
Appellate Division as the ultimate arbiter in most cases."1 4 This
stands in marked contrast to the system before the amendment
and mirrors the federal appellate system as illustrated by How-
112. See HOWARD, supra note 18, at 76; RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 22, at 161.
113. In 1981 the Court of Appeals decided 706 appeals while the Appellate Division
had 9,255 dispositions. See 1982 REP. OF CHIEF ADMIN. OF THE CTS., ST. OF N.Y. at 39, 40.
In 1988, the number of appeals decided by the Court of Appeals decreased to 369 while
the number of Appellate Division dispositions increased to 13,225. See 1989 Report,
supra note 32, at 25-26. Caution is urged in comparing the statistics shown because they
are of different categories for the different courts. Nonetheless, the contrasting direction
of the respective courts' caseloads is apparent.
114. In People v. Bleakley, 69 N.Y.2d 490, 508 N.E.2d 672, 515 N.Y.S.2d 761 (1987),
the Court of Appeals explained:
Unlike this court which, with few exceptions, passes on only questions of law,
intermediate appellate courts are empowered to review questions of law and ques-
tions of fact. They do so in both civil cases and criminal cases. Indeed, this unique
factual review power is the linchpin of our constitutional and statutory design
intended to afford each litigant at least one appellate review of the facts.
Id. at 493-94 (citations omitted).
The court's apparent acceptance, by not taking more civil cases for its review, of a single
level of appellate review in almost all civil cases can be seen as further evidenced by the
quoted passage.
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ard1 15 and Richardson and Vines.116
However, the extent, or even any effects, of the change may
be tempered by another development. In the terms prior to the
amendment, the Appellate Division granted leave-to-appeal in
cases constituting just over 10% of the Court of Appeals' civil
caseload. 1" In the terms after the amendment, this rate in-
creased and in the 1988-89 term had reached 26%.118 Several dy-
namics may be at work. These terms may represent a transition
period when the courts were searching to find their proper roles
under the new jurisdictional system. Alternatively, the Appellate
Division may be consciously granting leave to appeal in propor-
tionately more cases because of increasing caseloads or to com-
pensate for the diminished availability of appeals as-of-right.
This latter possibility would explain the increasing percentage of
cases in which the Appellate Division granted leave during the
terms after the amendment.119
The increase in the percentage of Appellate Division leave'
granted cases suggests that the Appellate Division may be grant-
ing leave-to-appeal in cases where appeals as-of-right previously
existed but are no longer available. 120 As the Appellate Division
observed the Court of Appeals' total caseload and number and
percentage of as-of-right appeals dwindle over the years, it may
have begun to grant leave-to-appeal more frequently in an effort
to maintain the status quo ante. Approximately 50% of the
cases in which the Appellate Division granted leave-to-appeal in
the terms after the amendment would have been appealable as-
of-right before the amendment but not after.121
Changes in the Appellate Division's decision-making process
can affect the Court of Appeals' decision-making process. Al-
though a case reaching the Court of Appeals by leave of the Ap-
pellate Division is permissive from the perspective of the liti-
gants and attorneys, it is mandatory for the Court of Appeals.
115. See HOWARD, supra note 18, at 76.
116. See RICHARDSON & VINES, supra note 22, at 161.
117. See Table A.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. Such as where the Appellate Division reversed or modified or a single Appellate
Division justice dissented.
121. See Table F.
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To this extent, an increase in the percentage of cases in which
the Appellate Division grants leave acts to counter the Court of
Appeals' discretion in choosing its caseload. This is precisely
what occurred between 1987-88 and 1988-89 when the percent-
age of cases reaching the Court of Appeals by that court's leave
decreased while the percentage of Appellate Division leave cases
increased. 2 ' Moreover, of all appeals heard by leave in the terms
after the amendment, the percentage of Court of Appeals leave-
granted cases decreased while Appellate Division leave-granted
cases increased." 3 These facts could evidence a conscious effort
by the Court of Appeals to maintain its civil caseload within a
specific range. If true, the court's ability to direct or influence
development of the law and its status as a policy organ will be
affected. Changes by the Appellate Division in response to the
jurisdictional amendment warrant careful attention considering
their ramifications on the Court of Appeals.
B. Appellate Division Dissents
Prior to the jurisdictional amendment, the dissent of one
Appellate Division justice in a civil case provided grounds for an
appeal as-of-right to the Court of Appeals, whereas after the
amendment the dissent of two Appellate Division justices was
required.'2 4 Based on this change, the presence and type of Ap-
pellate Division dissent has had definite implications on the
Court of Appeals' work. After the amendment there was a signif-
icant reduction in the rate of as-of-right appeals on the court's
civil docket.' 5
There has been little change in the rate at which appeals
with dissents in the Appellate Division appear on the Court of
Appeals' civil docket.' 6 Similarly, the rate of appeals predicated
on Appellate Division dissent - that is, with the requisite
number of Appellate Division justices dissenting for an appeal
122. See Table A.
123. See Table B.
124. See supra notes 66, 75 and accompanying text.
125. See Table A. In 1980-81, 80% of the civil caseload consisted of appeals as-of-
right. In 1988-89, only 28% of the civil caseload consisted of appeals as-of-right.
126. See Table G. The rate of cases on the Court of Appeals' civil docket where
there was any Appellate Division dissent was within 4 percentage points of 30% during
each term before and after the amendment.
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as-of-right - on the court's civil docket has remained relatively
constant, within four percentage points of 17% for the terms
before and after the jurisdictional change.127 In the absence of
any dramatic change in cases where Appellate Division dissent
was present in an appeal reaching the Court of Appeals and
where Appellate Division dissent compels the Court of Appeals
to take the appeal, the jurisdictional amendment may be seen as
having little or no effect.
These similarities may only mask more subtle changes. In
the terms after the amendment, when a single dissent no longer
provided an appeal as-of-right, the proportion of one dissent
cases of the Court of Appeals' caseload decreased by about one-
half.28 This suggests that a single dissent alone was not per-
ceived as sufficient reason for the Court of Appeals to grant
leave. Indeed in 1988-89, of nineteen one-dissent cases decided
by the Court of Appeals, only three reached the court by its per-
mission; whereas in 1987-88, thirteen of twenty-three one-dis-
sent cases reached the court in that manner.'29 The larger num-
ber of one dissent cases with leave granted by the Court of
Appeals in 1987-88 may be attributable to a transition period as
the court was becoming acquainted with the new jurisdictional
rules, or to some other aspect of the particular cases involved
such as the court's perception of their significance.
After the amendment the rate at which cases with two Ap-
pellate Division justices dissenting appeared on the court's civil
docket changed. Before the amendment, this rate was 14% and
11% in 1980-81 and 1981-82 respectively; whereas after the
amendment the rate rose to 16% in 1987-88 and to 27% in 1988-
89.130 Moreover, following the amendment, of the appeals with
Appellate Division dissent heard by the Court of Appeals, it is
considerably more likely that these appeals will have had two
Appellate Division justices dissenting.1 31 Of the two-dissent
127. Id.
128. See Table C. In 1980-81 and 1981-82, 20% and 17% respectively of the appeals
were one-dissent cases. In 1987-88 and 1988-89, only 11% of the appeals were one-dis-
sent cases.
129. See Table H.
130. See Table C.
131. See Table D. In 1988-89, 72% of the appeals with Appellate Division dissent
had two Appellate Division justices dissenting, as compared to 41% in 1980-81. It should
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cases on the Court of Appeals' civil docket during the two terms
after the amendment, about 10% in 1987-88 and 25% in 1988-89
were based on Appellate Division leave.13 2
These data tend to confirm that Appellate Division justices
may be adjusting their votes to accommodate for the two dissent
* rule; a phenomenon possibly explaining increases in the rate of
Appellate Division leave-granted cases after the amendment. Al-
though the increased rate of two-dissent cases must be consid-
ered against the relatively consistent rate of appeals predicated
on Appellate Division dissent, logic suggests that for the rate of
appeals predicated on an Appellate Division dissent to have re-
mained constant in light of the jurisdictional amendment, the
rate of two-dissent cases would have had to increase. Change in
the voting practices of Appellate Division justices remains a
plausible explanation for the observed changes.1 33
Having examined changes in the Court of Appeals' civil
caseload after the amendment from the perspective of access, it
is now appropriate to consider these projections from the per-
spective of the court's output-the decisional characteristics of its
written decisions.
VIII. Decisional Characteristics
A. Generally
In the terms prior to the amendment, the Court of Appeals
affirmed about two-thirds of its civil caseload.13' In the terms
after the amendment, the affirmance rate decreased to just over
60%, and the combined rates of reversal and modification in-
be remembered that merely having two dissents does not guarantee an appeal as-of-
right; the dissents must be on the law and the case must have met the finality require-
ment. Absent these requirements, the case may nonetheless reach the Court of Appeals
as-of-right (e.g., constitutional question) or with leave.
132. See Table I.
133. Considering this possibility, it is noteworthy that at least one Appellate Divi-
sion justice has called for the elimination of appeals as-of-right based on a double dissent
at the Appellate Division so as to make the Court of Appeals "a True Certiorari Court."
William C. Thompson, Streamlining the Appellate Process, N.Y.L.J., March 7, 1991, at
2, col. 3. So long as the Appellate Division retains authority to grant leave-to-appeal in a
civil case, elimination of the double dissent rule would provide only illusory relief.
134. See Table E.
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creased slightly. 13 This suggests that the court is slightly more
likely to reverse or modify under the current discretionary juris-
dictional plan than under the previous mandatory jurisdictional
scheme. But considering the dramatic shift from as-of-right ap-
peals to permissive appeals in the terms after the amendment, 36
it is surprising that there is only a slight decrease in the affirm-
ance rate after the amendment.3 ' This development would sup-
port the view that the Court of Appeals is more interested in
speaking on particular issues than correcting lower courts.
The court also appears to have achieved consensus in civil
cases as its unanimity rate hovered between 82% and 90% over
the terms studied.3 8 This high rate of unanimity is even more
pronounced if cases with one Court of Appeals judge dissenting
are combined with unanimous cases due to the limited dispute
generally engendered by these kinds of cases. 39 These limited-
dissent cases constituted 87% and 92% of the total for terms
before and after the amendment. 4 °
These high rates of unanimity provide an interesting point
of departure to test findings such as those by Provine, who at-
tributed high rates of unanimity in decisions to grant or deny
review to common role perceptions.4 Judges may act in certain
ways regardless of their selection method or may be saving their
disputes for criminal cases. What is apparent, though, is that the
court's consistently high rate of unanimity stands in marked
contrast to the findings of Halpern and Vines, who identified a
long term trend toward increased divisiveness on the United
States Supreme Court following the passage of legislation pro-
viding the Court with much discretion over its caseload. 42
There does seem to be a substantial change in the type of
decision utilized by the Court of Appeals after the amendment.
In the terms prior to the amendment, the court used opinions
135. Id.
136. See Table A.
137. See Table E.
138. Id.
139. See Table J.
140. Id.
141. See PROVINE, supra note 19, at 174-75.
142. See Halpern & Vines, supra note 19, at 483.
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for about 25% of its civil cases. 4" In the terms after the amend-
ment, the use of opinions rose to over 50% in 1987-88 before
declining to about 40% in 1988-89.'1" The increased rate of opin-
ions may reflect greater importance attached by the court, to
those cases it selects to review under the new jurisdictional
scheme. This proposition is supported by the decreased rate of
opinions in 1988-89,"41 a term when the proportion of Court of
Appeals leave-granted cases on the court's docket decreased.1 41
The court might have considered as-of-right cases on its civil
docket less important and thus less worthy of a opinion. The
increased rate of opinions may also reflect an increased amount
of time available to the judges to write opinion quality decisions-
as the total civil caseload decreased. Regardless, it remains evi-
dent that the court has begun concentrating its efforts on opin-
ions rather than memoranda.
The possibility that the increase in use of opinions by the
Court of Appeals reflects the increased importance it places on
its discretionary caseload finds additional support in the de-
creasing rate at which the court has expressly relied on the rea-
soning of the Appellate Division.' 7 In the terms prior to the
amendment, the court decided a case with express reliance on an
Appellate Division decision 30% of the time.' 48 In 1987-88, this
rate dropped to 11% only to rebound to 20% in 1988-89, still
well below the rates before the jurisdictional change.'4 9
The court's failure to rely on the reasoning of a lower court
decision could reflect the importance attached by the Court of
Appeals to the matters raised in a case. The substantial drop in
express reliance on lower courts' decisions in 1987-8816o might
well reflect the fact that the Court of Appeals is exercising its
increased discretion in choosing important cases to decide. The
143. See Table E.
144. Id.
145. Id.
146. See Table A.
147. See Table E. It should be remembered that the Court of Appeals may affirm
for the reasons stated in the Appellate Division decision and reverse or modify for the
reasons stated in an Appellate Division justice's dissent.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Id.
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rebound in express reliance observed in 1988-89151 may reflect a
phenomenon already touched upon - a decrease in Court of
Appeals leave-granted cases with the corresponding increase in
Appellate Division leave-granted and as-of-right cases between
the 1987-88 and 1988-89 terms.152 These latter kinds of cases
may be viewed by the Court of Appeals as hindering its discre-
tion to hear more important cases. Therefore, the court may feel
less constrained to rely on the lower courts' reasoning in these
"less important" cases. When we consider decisional characteris-
tics as grouped by jurisdictional predicate, we will be able to
consider more precisely some of these possibilities.
B. Dissent in the Appellate Division
The possibility exists that a dispute among one set of judges
will cause reviewing judges to approach that disputed case in a
particular manner. Although one study found no conclusive evi-
dence that intra-circuit dispute prompted reversal by the United
States Supreme Court,1 53 another cautiously offers some evi-
dence that intra-court dispute by a state intermediate appellate
court may affect the state supreme court's decision-making pro-
cess.1  Flango made similar findings. 155 In view of this possibil-
ity, and the jurisdictional amendment changing the effect of a
single dissent in the Appellate Division, it is appropriate to con-
sider whether the Court of Appeals' treatment of cases with one
or two dissents at the Appellate Division has changed after the
amendment.
In the terms before and after the amendment, the rate of
unanimity in one dissent cases seems to have remained fairly
constant, around 90%.15' But similarities seem to end there. In
the terms prior to the amendment, about two-thirds of one-dis-
sent cases were affirmed by the Court of Appeals, whereas in the
terms after the amendment, the affirmance rate was
less - 30% in 1987-88 and just over 50% in 1988-89.157 Opin-
151. Id.
152. See Table A.
153. See HOWARD, supra note 18, at 67-71.
154. See Baum, supra note 30, at 725.
155. See Flango, supra note 31, at 390-92.
156. See Table K.
157. Id.
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ions were used more frequently after the amendment, rising
from around 25% of one-dissent cases in the terms before the
amendment to over 60% in 1987-88 and about 40% in 1988-
89. 158 Also, the court provided its own rationale more frequently
in the terms after the amendment.1 59 In the terms before the
amendment over 30% of one-dissent cases adopted Appellate
Division reasoning as compared to less than 30% in the terms
after the amendment, although the rate was much lower, in
1987-88 - 17% - as compared with 26% in 1988-89.110 The
changes after the amendment support the earlier suggestion that
the court has become more selective, limiting its docket to im-
portant cases.
The congruence of lower affirmance rate, higher opinion rate
and lower rate of reliance on Appellate Division reasoning in
1987-88 as compared to 1988-89,"'1 taken together with a higher
percentage of cases heard by leave of the Court of Appeals in
1987-88,62 further supports the view that the court was inde-
pendently assessing the worthiness of cases for its consideration
and was not influenced by the appearance of an Appellate Divi-
sion dissent as a cue. Otherwise, one might have expected to see
more than the 16% of one-dissent cases on the court's docket by
its leave in 1988-89.163 These data tend to refute the earlier sug-
gestion that a large percentage of one-dissent cases appearing on
the court's civil docket by its leave in 1987-88 resulted from
transitional effects shortly after the amendment. It seems more
likely, with support from several perspectives, that the court be-
gan immediately to exercise its discretion in identifying cases it
deemed significant.
This assessment is consistent with conclusions suggested by
the data derived from cases involving a double dissent at the
Appellate Division."" Two-dissent cases in 1988-89 became more
than twice as frequent as a proportion of cases in the Court of
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. See id. (despite a similar percentage of one-dissent cases on the civil docket as
shown in Table G).
162. See Table A.
163. See Table H.
164. See Table I.
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Appeals than was true before the amendment and almost twice
as frequent as a proportion of cases in the Court of Appeals than
in 1987-88.166 But the rates of affirmance, use of opinion and re-
liance on Appellate Division reasoning stayed remarkably simi-
lar in the terms after the amendment compared to the rates in
the terms before the amendment, although the percentages in
these terms are not stable, either before or after the amend-
ment.16 6 For example, the court affirmed slightly more than one-
half of the two-dissent cases in 1980-81 and 1987-88 and two-
thirds in 1981-82 and 1988-89. 67 Similarly, the court used opin-
ions in 34% and 24% of the two-dissent cases in the terms
before the amendment and 28% and 31% in the terms after. 168
The court relied on Appellate Division reasoning in 32% and
23% of the two-dissent cases in the terms before the amendment
and 22% and 35% in the terms after.16 9 A larger shift is appar-
ent only in the rate of unanimity, which increased from 75% and
84% of the two-dissent cases in the terms before the amendment
to 88% and 90% in the terms after the amendment.17 1
This relative lack of change in the overall pattern of deci-
sional characteristics in two-dissent cases, despite a doubling in
the rate of two-dissent cases after the amendment, suggests that
the court has not been particularly swayed in its perception of
cases by the increased importance attached to two Appellate Di-
vision justices dissenting after the amendment. The court's abil-
ity to assess and decide cases independently, without being in-
fluenced by the nature or extent of Appellate Division dissent, is
evident. Again, the data tend to support the view that the Court
of Appeals does not depend on cues involving intra-Appellate
Division dissent.
C. Of-Right and By Leave
The changes in the jurisdictional composition of the Court
of Appeals' caseload and some of the decisional characteristics of
165. See Table G.
166. See Table L.
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
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the court's output suggest that the court is concentrating on
cases it perceives as more important. The court may also be con-
strained in its work by changes in the voting practices of Appel-
late Division justices. We now turn to the decisional characteris-
tics of the court's output as grouped by jurisdictional predicate
to consider in more detail the changes after the amendment."'
As noted earlier, the rate of as-of-right appeals has declined
dramatically after the amendment. 1 7  The rate of affirmance in
as-of-right cases, however, has not changed substantially.1 73 In
the terms before the amendment, 70% and 75% of the appeals
as-of-right were affirmed, but after the change 61% and 70% of
this kind of appeal were affirmed.17' Similarly, the rate of una-
nimity in as-of-right cases before and after the amendment
stayed relatively constant.1 75 In the terms before the amend-
ment, 85% and 90% of as-of-right cases were unanimous com-
pared to 85% and 82% of this kind of appeal in the terms after
the amendment.1 76
More striking is the post-amendment increase in the use of
opinions. 17 7 In the terms before the amendment, some 20% and
19% of as-of-right cases were decided by opinion compared to
46% and 32% afterwards.17 8 Reliance on Appellate Division rea-
soning rose only slightly in 1988-89 compared to before the
amendment with the court adopting the reasoning below in 42%
of as-of-right appeals in 1988-89 and 35% and 36% in the terms
before the amendment.17 9 Interestingly, the Court of Appeals re-
lied on Appellate Division reasoning in 1987-88 only 20% of the
time.' 80 Since 1987-88 was the term when use of opinions in as-
of-right cases rose to 46%181 one might suspect that the court
was confronted with particularly important as-of-right appeals
171. See Tables M (rates of affirmance), N (rates of unanimity) and 0 (rates of
decision type).
172. See Table A.
173. See Table M.
174. Id.
175. See Table N.
176. Id.
177. See Table 0.
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. Id.
181. Id.
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during this term, which seems consistent with other characteris-
tics of the 1987-88 term discussed earlier.
The proportion of the Court of Appeals' civil caseload com-
posed of Court of Appeals leave-granted cases is much greater
after the amendment than before, as was the intent of the
amendment. 182 Although this grant of discretion would seem
consistent with a decreased affirmance rate, especially in the
cases decided by the court pursuant to its leave, the affirmance
rate in Court of Appeals leave-granted cases actually increased
after the amendment. 183 Forty-nine percent and 43% of the
Court of Appeals leave-granted cases were affirmed in the terms
before the amendment, compared with 62% and 59% in the
terms after. 1 8 This result supports the hypothesis that the court
is less concerned about policing the Appellate Division and cor-
recting errors than in insuring that its imprint is on important
cases. The increased rate of affirmance after the amendment
seems most surprising, and is contrary to the findings of
Baum,18 5 for example, that courts with discretionary jurisdiction
review cases with a mind toward reversal. The Court of Appeals
does not seem to be acting in the expected manner, preferring
instead to concentrate on truly important appeals. The Court of
Appeals' limited reliance on Appellate Division reasoning in
cases to which the Court of Appeals itself granted leave - only
about 10% in the terms after the amendment 8 ' - supports
this theory. The fairly high rate at which the court uses opinions
to decide cases in which it granted leave - a rate hovering
around 50% - also supports this theory. 87
That the rate of opinions is not even higher may reflect a
determination by the Court of Appeals that one of its memoran-
dum rulings is considered sufficient in its leave-granted cases
when the only alternative is an Appellate Division decision on
the subject. It should be noted that the 50% rate of use of opin-
ions after the amendment is roughly similar to the rate of the
182. See Table A.
183. See Table M.
184. Id.
185. See Baum, supra note 30.
186. See Table 0.
187. Id.
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court's use of opinions generally. 8 8 The rate of unanimity in
Court of Appeals leave-granted cases was inconsistent but can
be seen as higher in the terms after the amendment.18
As noted earlier, of the cases decided by the Court of Ap-
peals, the Appellate Division granted leave more frequently after
the jurisdictional amendment than before.'90 The decisional
characteristics of these cases, however, have not changed much
after the amendment. The rate of affirmance in Appellate Divi-
sion leave cases has remained around 60% '91 and the rate of
unanimity has remained around 80%."e2 In addition, the rate at
which opinions were used was slightly higher in 1987-88, when it
increased to 59% of the Appellate Division leave-granted cases,
as compared to 46% and 43% in the terms before the amend-
ment and 40% in 1988-89. e" Similarly, the rate of reliance on
Appellate Division reasoning was lower in 1987-88, at 9% of Ap-
pellate Division leave-granted cases, compared to 20% and 23%
before the amendment and 17% in 1988-89.' The rather large
difference for the 1987-88 term is consistent with other changes
seen during that term and could support the conclusion that
1987-88 was the transition year for the court, or that the court
identified more important cases that particular term. This latter
explanation may be preferable given the other evidence sug-
gesting that the court is exercising its discretion in identifying
important and significant cases for treatment by the Court of
Appeals.
The rate of affirmance for appeals arising by Court of Ap-
peals leave has increased after the amendment to levels compa-
rable to, or slightly lower than, the rates of affirmance for ap-
peals arising by the other jurisdictional predicates. 195 This
suggests that the Court of Appeals may not be influenced by the
manner in which the appeal arose in reaching an outcome. The
188. See Table E.
189. See Table N. In the terms before the amendment, 65% and 87% of these cases
were unanimous whereas in the terms after the amendment 91% and 81% were
unanimous.
190. See Table A.
191. See Table M.
192. See Table N.
193. See Table 0.
194. Id.
195. See Table M.
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court may not be using the jurisdictional predicate, as it did not
use Appellate Division dissent, as a cue. Rather, the court seems
more concerned about addressing important issues.
This phenomenon is further reflected in comparisons of
other decisional characteristics. For example, the combined rate
of opinions in as-of-right and Appellate Division leave-granted
cases, (those which are mandatory from the Court of Appeals'
perspective), in 1988-89 is 36% as compared to 46% for Court of
Appeals leave-granted cases, (those which are truly discretionary
for the court). 196 The data reveal that in combined as-of-right
and Appellate Division leave-granted cases during 1987-88 and
1988-89, the Court of Appeals relied on Appellate Division rea-
soning at rates of 15% and 30%, respectively, as compared to
lower rates of 10% and 11% for Court of Appeals leave-granted
cases during the respective terms. 197 The court seems least likely
to offer its own explanation in deciding an appeal in those cases
it has no discretion to hear and which it may perceive as less
important or worthy of full Court of Appeals treatment."9 8 The
court's apparent trend to concentrate on cases it perceives as
important finds added support from this comparison.
IX. Conclusion
This paper is offered as the initial step in a comprehensive
review of the Court of Appeals. It is designed to examine the
decision-making processes of the Court of Appeals and the
changes in those processes wrought by an alteration to the
court's jurisdictional bases. From a broader perspective, the
study also sheds light on differences in ,how an appellate court
operates under discretionary and mandatory systems of
jurisdiction.
Some courts with discretionary jurisdiction, such as the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court, have been identified as interested in ac-
cepting cases for review based on an intention to reverse way-
ward lower courts. Other courts, such as the United States
196. See Table 0.
197. Id.
198. In 1988-89, reliance on the Appellate Division reasoning in as-of right cases was
42%, as opposed to 11% in Court of Appeals leave-granted cases and 17% in Appellate
Division leave-granted cases.
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Supreme Court, have been seen to exercise their certiorari pow-
ers more for setting policy than correcting error or policing lower
courts. The New York Court of Appeals, after receiving a broad
grant of discretion over its civil caseload, seems to be more like
the United States Supreme Court than the California Supreme
Court. From their consistently high rates of affirmance, even for
cases the court chooses to hear, to the increased rate of use of
opinions, an emphatic decision type, Court of Appeals decisions
now exhibit characteristics we can associate with a primary pur-
pose of deciding cases the court perceives as important. This
stands in marked contrast to the court's decisional characteris-
tics before the amendment, when it was required to review hun-
dreds of civil appeals involving issues generally recognized as le-
gally, politically or socially insignificant. As an amendment
designed to address this situation, the change to a discretionary
jurisdiction seems to have accomplished its objective.
This shift in focus, however, has not come without resis-
tance or cost. It appears that the Appellate Division justices may
be altering their voting practices so as to satisfy the recently re-
stricted appeal as-of-right requirements and thereby limit the
Court of Appeals' discretion in choosing its caseload. Moreover,
the Court of Appeals' shift in emphasis away from an error-cor-
rection function can be described as dramatically altering the
nature of appellate justice in New York. The Appellate Division,
previously subject to more scrutiny from the Court of Appeals,
now exists as the ultimate arbiter in most cases. That the Court
of Appeals has refused to accept more civil cases for review can
be seen as a tacit endorsement of this system. This development
makes resolution of the existing caseload crisis in the Appellate
Division all the more essential.
Other matters remain for consideration. For example, it
would be useful to consider whether decisional characteristics
identified during 1987-88 and 1988-89 continue during more re-
cent terms. This research would permit assessments of the judi-
cial decision-making process more removed from a period of
transition when recent appointees and the new jurisdictional
scheme could have had some effect on the outcomes observed.
Additional consideration of the manner in which the Court of
Appeals and the Appellate Division grant leave-to-appeal also
would shed light on some preliminary findings suggested, such
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as the possibility that Appellate Division justices have altered
their voting patterns in response to the jurisdictional amend-
ment. Comparisons of decisional characteristics in civil and
criminal cases also would provide useful insight into the court's
work. Analyzing the court's judicial selection process and inter-
nal procedures also may illuminate the work of the court. The
opportunity to study these aspects of the judicial decision-mak-
ing process serves to remind us that the Court of Appeals re-
mains an almost untapped resource for examining how courts
conduct their business. This article does little more than peek at
the tip of the iceberg. There remains more to know. Method-
ological Note
The jurisdictional predicate presented the most troubling
choice in data collection. Each Court of Appeals decision re-
ported in the official New York Reports specifies the case's juris-
dictional basis or predicate. The statement of jurisdictional
predicate is prepared by the Law Reporting Bureau, an adjunct
of the Court of Appeals, in conjunction with and subject to ap-
proval by the judge who authored the decision. 199 Especially for
cases decided under the pre-1986 jurisdictional rules, it is possi-
ble that cases were appealable on more than one ground, e.g., a
dissent in and reversal by the Appellate Division, or a dissent in
and a substantial constitutional question resolved by the Appel-
late Division. Since this study was concerned with differences
between the broad categories of appeals as-of-right and appeals
by permission, a problem arose where multiple predicates falling
within the different categories were specified. To maintain data
uncluttered by these anomalous cases, these few cases were ex-
cluded from the study.20 0
In addition, numerous cases specified only one jurisdictional
predicate but further analysis revealed other appealable grounds
available, e.g., an Appellate Division reversal was specified as the
jurisdictional predicate but there was also an unspecified Appel-
late Division dissenter. The Law Reporting Bureau reviews the
appellate record and determines the appropriate jurisdictional
predicate in preparing the jurisdictional statement for a deci-
199. Telephone Interview with Frederick A. Muller, N.Y. State Reporter (Nov. 29,
1990).
200. There were two cases in 1981-82.
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sion, apparently designating the predicate relied on by the court
in reaching its decision.2 0 ' For purposes of this study, despite
the possibility of multiple predicates, I have chosen to adopt the
jurisdictional predicate reported in the official New York Re-
ports because the Law Reporting Bureau and Court of Appeals'
judges work together to specify the jurisdictional predicate of
the case. Consideration of the choices made in specifying a juris-
dictional predicate is beyond the scope of this study.
A related difficulty concerns multiple appeals in the same
case. Cross appeals, for example, can be based on similar or dif-
ferent jurisdictional predicates. Since this study's focus was on
the frequency at which various decisional characteristics occur in
cases and not with specific appeals, multiple appeals in the same
case were disregarded to the extent that they were based on the
same jurisdictional category, e.g., as-of-right or by permission.
Where multiple appeals in the same case were based on the dif-
ferent jurisdictional categories, the case was excluded. 0 2
TABLE A
Civil Caseload by Jurisdictional Predicate
Appeals by Appeals by
Total Court of Appellate
Appeals as Appeals Appeals Division Total
of Right by Leave Leave Leave Appeals
1980-81 377 (80%) 93 (20%) 37 (8%) 56 (12%) 470 (100%)
1981-82 430 (78%) 121 (22%) 60 (11%) 61 (11%) 551 (100%)
1987-88 41 (20%) 165 (80%) 131 (64%) 34 (17%) 206 (100%)
1988-89 50 (28%) 130 (72%) 83 (46%) 47 (26%) 180 (100%)
NOTE: Percentage shown is of total appeals.
201. See Muller, supra note 199.
202. There were seven cases in 1980-81 and three in 1981-82.
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TABLE B
Proportion of Appeals by Leave
Appeals by Court
of Appeals Leave
37 (40%)
60 (50%)
131 (79%)
83 (64%)
Appeals by Appellate
Division Leave
56 (60%)
61 (50%)
34 (21%)
47 (36%)
Total Appeals
by Leave
93 (100%)
121 (100%)
165 (100%)
130 (100%)
TABLE C
Appeals with
Appellate Division
Appeals with One
Appellate Division
Justice Dissenting
95 (20%)
96 (17%)
23 (11%)
19 (11%)
One and Two
Justices Dissenting
Appeals with Two
Appellate Division
Justices Dissenting
65 (14%)
63 (11%)
32 (16%)
49 (27%)
TABLE D
Proportion of Appeals with One and Two
Appellate Division Justices Dissenting
Appeals with One
Appellate Division
Justice Dissenting
95 (59%)
96 (60%)
23 (42%)
19 (28%)
Appeals with Two
Appellate Division
Justices Dissenting
65 (41%)
63 (40%)
32 (58%)
49 (72%)
1980-81
1981-82
1987-88
1988-89
1980-81
1981-82
1987-88
1988-89
Total
Appeals
470 (100%)
551 (100%)
206 (100%)
180 (100%)
1980-81
1981-82
1987-88
1988-89
Total
Appeals
160 (100%)
159 (100%)
55 (100%)
68 (100%)
[Vol. 12:61
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol12/iss1/2
WHEN LESS IS MORE
TABLE E
Decisional Characteristics of
Civil Appeals
1980-81
Affirmance
Reversal
Modification
Dismissal
Opinion
Memorandum
Unanimous
Nonunanimous
Reliance on
Appellate Division
Total
316 (67%)
122 (26%)
31 (7%)
1 (-%)
1981-82
383 (70%)
133 (24%)
34 (6%)
1 (-%)
1987-88
127 (62%)
64 (31%)
13 (6%)
2 (1%)
1988-89
113 (63%)
53 (29%)
13 (7%)
1 (1%)
123 (26%) 132 (24%) 109 (53%) 73 (41%)
347 (74%) 419 (76%) 97 (47%) 107 (59%)
386 (82%) 495 (90%) 181 (88%) 148 (82%)
84 (18%) 56 (10%) 25 (12%) 32 (18%)
148 (31%) 171 (31%) 23 (11%) 38 (21%)
470 (100%) 551 (100%) 206 (100%) 180 (100%)
TABLE F
Appeals by Appellate Division Leave After
Amendment that would have been As of
Right Before the Amendment
Appeals that would have
been As of Right Before
the Amendment
18 (53%)
18 (38%)
Total Appeals by
Appellate Division
Leave
34 (100%)
47 (100%)
81 (100%)
1987-88
1988-89
1992]
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TABLE G
Appeals with Appellate Division Dissent
and Predicated on Appellate Division Dissent
Appeals with Appeals Predicated
Appellate Division on Appellate Division Total
Dissent Dissent* Appeals
1980-81 160 (34%) 86 (18%) 470 (100%)
1981-82 159 (29%) 71 (13%) 551 (100%)
1987-88 55 (27%) 29 (14%) 206 (100%)
1988-89 68 (38%) 36 (20%) 180 (100%)
* In 1980-81 and 1981-82, one Appellate Division Justice dissenting
was sufficient for an appeal as of right and to supply the predicate for
an appeal. In 1987-88 and 1988-89, two Appellate Division Justices dis-
senting were required.
TABLE H
Jurisdictional Bases of Appeals with One
Appellate Division Justice Dissenting After the
Amendment
Appeals
As of
Right
1987-88 1 (4%)
1988-89 1 (5%)
Appeals
by Court of
Appeals
Leave
13 (57%)
3 (16%)
Appeals
by Appellate
Division
Leave
9 (39%)
15 (79%)
Total Appeals with
One Appellate
Division Justice
Dissenting
23 (100%)
19 (100%)
TABLE I
Jurisdictional Bases of Appeals with
Two Appellate Division Justices
Dissenting After the Amendment
Appeals
As of
Right
1987-88 29 (91%)
1988-89 36 (73%)
Appeals by
Court of
Appeals Leave
0 (0%)
1 (2%)
Appeals by
Appellate Division
Leave
3 (9%)
12 (25%)
Total Appeals with
Two Appellate
Division Justices
Dissenting
32 (100%)
49 (100%)
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TABLE J
Appeals with Limited Dissent
Unanimous One Dissent Total Appeals
Appeals Appeals with Limited Dissent
407 (87%)
507 (92%)
192 (93%)
156 (87%)
TABLE K
Decisional Characteristics of Appeals
with One Appellate Division
Justice Dissenting
1980-81 1981-82 1987-88 1988-89
Affirmance
Reversal
Modification
Dismissal
Unanimous
Nonunanimous
Opinion
Memorandum
Reliance on
Appellate Division
Total Appeals with
One Appellate Divison
Justice Dissenting
69 (73%)
22 (23%)
3 (3%)
1 (1%)
61 (64%)
24 (25%)
11 (11%)
0 (0%)
7 (30%)
15 (65%)
1 (5%)
0 (0%)
10 (53%)
6 (32%)
3 (16%)
0 (0%)
81 (85%) 87 (91%) 22 (95%) 17 (89%)
14 (15%) 9 (9%) 1 (5%) 2 (11%)
23 (24%) 26 (27%) 14 (61%) 7 (37%)
72 (76%) 70 (73%) 9 (39%) 12 (63%)
29 (31%) 34 (35%) 4 (17%) 5 (26%)
95 (100%) 96 (100%) 23 (100%) 19 (100%)
1980-81
1981-82
1987-88
1988-89
Total
Appeals
470 (100%)
551 (100%)
206 (100%)
180 (100%)
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TABLE L
Decisional Characteristics of Appeals
with Two Appellate Division
Justices Dissenting
1980-81 1981-82 1987-88 1988-89
Affirmance 34 (52%) 42 (67%) 19 (59%) 33 (67%)
Reversal 25 (38%) 15 (24%) 9 (28%) 12 (24%)
Modification 6 (9%) 6 (9%) 3 (9%) 4 (8%)
Dismissal 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (4%) 0 (0%)
Unanimous 49 (75%) 53 (84%) 28 (88%) 44 (90%)
Nonunanimous 16 (25%) 10 (16%) 4 (12%) 5 (10%)
Opinion 22 (34%) 15 (24%) 9 (28%) 15 (31%)
Memorandum 43 (66%) 48 (76%) 23 (72%) 34 (69%)
Reliance on
Appellate Division 21 (32%) 15 (24%) 7 (22%) 17 (35%)
Total Appeals
with Two
Appellate Division
Justices
Dissenting 65 (100%) 63 (100%) 32 (100%) 49 (100%)
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